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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
LA~IO:\"T

F. TOHONTO,
Pia in tiff-Respond rnt,
- vs.-

(H~ORGE D. CLYDE, A. PRATT
L~~R, CLAIR R. HOPKINS and
~TATE OF UTAH,

KESTHE

Case No.
10069

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT
~TATEJ\lENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action for a declaratory judgment to detennine the constitutionality of certain portions of Chapter 148, Laws of Utah 1963, codified as Chapter 2 of
Title 63, lTtah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, commonly known as Senate Bill 48 of the 35th Legislature.
The action was also brought for a determination that
the payment to the defendant Clair R. Hopkins, Director of Finance of the State of Utah, of his salary for
the period July 1 through July 15, 1963 was unlawful.
The portions of the act sought to be declared unconstitutional relate to the payment of expenditures of state
funds without the approval prior to payn1ent of the
Board of Examiners of the State of l~tah.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
'The judgment and decree of the lower court (R. 3538) determined:
1. The Board of Examiners has the duty to examine
all claims against the state with the sole exception of
salaries or compensation fixed by law but including
claims for which an appropriation has been made as
well as claims for which no appropriation has been
made. The payment of any such claim against the State
of Utah prior to the examination and approval of the
same by the Board of Examiners is unlawful except
where such claim has previously been denied by the
Board of Examiners and appealed to and approved by
the Legislature.
2. Insofar as Senate Bill 48 of the 35th Legislature
authorized the Director of Finance to process and pay
claims against the state (other than salaries or compensation fixed by law) without the exmnination and approval of the Board of Exa1niners of the State of Utah
prior to the payment thereof, such authority is void,
unconstitutional and unlawful and in particular the following portions of Section 63-2-13, 63-2-15 and 63-2-20,
Utah Code Annotated 1953 are unconstitutional:
"63-2-13. The director of finance shall prescribe and fix a schedule of salaries for the officers, clerks, stenographers and employees of all
state offices, departments, boards and commissions, except where such salaries are fixed by
statute, by appropriation or where agency governing boards are authorized by statute to fix
the salary of certain officers. . . . The board of
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•·xaminen; in eon dud ing any .-xmnination of
<'laims shall not han· authority to fix, re~<'t or
arhi t rari ly n·fusl' to pay ~alaries ~l't hy the director of finaneP or officer's salaries as detennined
by ag-•·n<·~· governing boards. Such schedule of
~alari('~ :-;hall have the force of law in all state
offices, departments, boards and commissions,
and shall in no <·asc~ be exceeded without the exLH'PSS approval of the director of finance. .K o
salary schedule shall be put into effect until approved h~· the governor.
"G:J-~-15. The director of finance shall establish 1nileage and travel expense schedules and
set up rules and regulations for travel of all
state officers, employees and part-time officials;
and such schedules shall have the force of law
in all deparbnents and no voucher for travel expense shall be paid until the smne has been approved b~T the director. No obligation shall be
incurred for travel outside of the state without
the advance approval of the governor through
the director of finance. Such approval shall consist of a certification as to the availability of
funds as well as a review of the necessity and
desirability of such travel. This provision shall
not apply to the legislature, legislative committees or me1nbers and employees of the legislative
council.

"63-2-20. . . . The director shall examine and
approve or disapprove all requisitions and req nests for proposed expenditures of the several
deparbnents, except salaries or compensation of
officers fixed by law in which case the director
shall certify only the availability of funds, and
no requisitions of any of the departments shall
be allowed nor shall any obligation be created
without the approval and the certification of the
director. . . . It is the intent of the legislature
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that the department of finance shall exa1nine and
pass upon all proposed expenditures. Any examination of" claims as may be conducted by the
board of examiners shall be made prior to payment but only after the obligation has been incurred and an account has been submitted and
audited by the state's accounting officer."
3. The Board of Examiners may not delegate its
ultimate duty to determine the validity of claims against
the State of Utah but may make reasonable rules concerning its methods of examining claims and should
hold regular meetings of such Board for the proper
execution of its constitutional duties.
4. The payment of the salary claim of Clair R.
Hopkins for the pay period July 1 through July 15, 1963
was unlawful, invalid and void and constituted an illegal expenditure of public funds since this claim was
paid without the prior approval of the Board of ExamIners.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and Respondent seeks affirmance of the
judgment and decree of the court below.
STA:TEMENT OF FACT8
·The statement of facts set forth in the brief of
appellants is accurate and correctly quotes the stipulation of facts entered into by the parties which are a
part of the record on appeal. The court's attention is
called to Exhibits "A," "B," "C" and "D," referred to
in the stipulation and included in the record, but which
are not quoted at length in Appellants' brief.
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ABUl.~IENT

POIXT L
rrlii•: BOARD OF EXA~IINER~ HA~ THE
Dl.TY '1_10 EXAl\UKE ALL C LA I ~IS
AGAI~ST THE STATE EXCEPT SAL.\ HIE~ OR (•<>~IPEXSATION OF OFFICERS
FIXED BY LA \\T.
It i~ well settled by a long linP of decisions of this
t•onrt that the Board of Exan1iners of the State of lTtah
has the quasi-judicial authority granted by the Utah
Constitution (Article YII, Section 13) to exmnine and
approve or disapprove all clai1ns against the state t•xeept
~alarie:::; or cmnpensation fixed by law. This authority
applies not only to claims for which no appropriation
has bePn 1nade (the typical tort claim or contract claim
not within the scope of an appropriation, often referred
to as "unliquidated" clai1ns) but also to claims for which
an appropriation has been 1nade (ordinary expenditures
of funds appropriated by the Legislature, sometilnes
referred to as ''liquidated" claims). U intah State Bank
r. Aja.r, 77 rtah 455, :297 Pac. -13-! (1931); Bateman r.
Board of Examiners, 7 F.:2d :2:21, 322 P.2d 381 (1958).
The constitutional provision itself provides an appeal
to the Legislature from a denial of the claiin. vVood v.
Budge. 13 U.2d 359, 37-1 P.2d 516 (196:2). Also, the prior
decisions of this court have indicated that any arbitrary action by the Board of Exmniners would be subject to court review. Bateman v. Board of Examiners,
supra; State ex rel. Dat·is v. Cutler, 3-! rtah 99, 95 Pac.
1071 (1908); Thoreson L State Board of Examiners,
19 rtah 18, 57 Pac. 1'75 (1899); :21 Utah lSI, 60 Pac.
98:2 (1900).
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The term claim within the meaning of the constitutional language is an t'xtremely broad one and comprehends all requests for expenditures of public funds.
This court defined "claim" in Bateman v. Board of
Examiners, 7 U.2d at 226, as follows:
"In the first place, we think that the word
'claim' was used in its broadest connotation and
we recognize that it is susceptible of a variety of
meanings : ranging from a moral claim; or the
seeking of legislative largesse ; or asserting a
privilege; to asserting rights to cmnpensation for
property or materials furnished, or salary for
services rendered, to the state."
The Board of Examiners clearly has the duty to
exercise its constitutional authority and this n1ust be
considered more than a mere power to exercise or not
exercise this authority as determined by majority vote
of the Board. The concept of a constitutional duty to
examine claims is the holding in the .landmark case of
Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, supra, and is also the basis
of the holding in State ex rel. Davis v. Edwards, 33 Utah
243, 93 Pac. 720 (1908).
This is consistent with general constitutional and
statutory rules of interpretation. Powers conferred on
public officers are generally construed as mandatory
even where the authority is couched in permissive language. In Supervisors of Rock Island County v. United
States, 4 Wall. 435, 18 L.Ed. 419, the court held that
a statute providing that county officials "may, if deemed
advisable" levy a special tax to pay certain debts, was
mandatory and not permissive.
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"Tiw conclusion to hP deduced from the authorities is that wht·r.- power is given to public
officers, in the language of the act before us,
or in equivalent language, - whenever the public
inten•st or individual rights call for its exercise,
- the language used, though permissive in fonn,
is in fact peren1ptory. vVhat they are empowered
to do for a third person the law requires shall be
done. The power is given not for their benefit,
but for his. It is placed with the depository to
Ineet the demands of right, and to prevent a failure of justice. It is given as a remedy to those
entitled to invoke its aid, and who would otherwise be remediless. In all such cases it is held
that the intent of the legislature, which is the
test, was not to devolve a mere discretion, but to
impose 'a positive and absolute duty.' "

Siinilarly, in Palmcroft Development Company v.
Oity of Phoenix, -!6 Ariz. 200, 49 P.2d 626, the language
"authorized and empowered" to pay certain indebtedness was held to ilnpose a 1nandatory duty to pay such
indebtedness. See also 43 Ant. Jur. 76, Public Officers,
Section 259 and annotation at 103 A.L.R. 812 for cases
involving constitutional or statutory provisions relating
to payments of public debts.
These general principles were enunciated by this
court in Deseret Savings Bank v. Francis, 62 Utah 85,
:.!17 Pac.114, where it was stated:
"vVhen power is given by statute to public
officers, in permissive language, the language
used will be regarded as peremptory where the
public interest or individual rights require that
it should be."
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Recognition that this principle applies to Article
YII, Section 13, Utah Constitution, is evidenced by the
statement in Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, 297 Pac. at 438,
that the Legislature may not, within the lilnits of the
Constitution, "exclude the Board of Exmniners from its
duty and responsibility with respect to claims." Al~o
note that while the section grants the Board of Examiners "power" to exmnine clailns, it requires the Board
to "perform such other duties as may be prescribed by
law." Certainly our Utah Constitution would be a meaningless docu1nent if the powers granted to public officers we1·e construed as permissive - governn1ent by
'vhim, not by law.
POINT II.
CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 63, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953, IS UNCONSTITUTIONA'L INSOFAR AS IT AUTHORIZED PAYMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE
WITHOUT THE EXAMINATION AND APPROVAL OF THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS.
Turning now to the statute involved, it is apparent
that the Legislature intended to deprive the Board of
Examiners of any statutory authority to examine liquidated claims against the State. See the statements in
63-2-1 and the amend1nents to Chapter 6 of Title 63,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, effected by one of the companion bills to Senate Bill 48 - Chapter 150, Laws of
Utah 1963. To this we do not and of course could not
object, but the essential authority of the Board of Examiners is dependent upon the Constitution itself which
has been held to be a self-executing provision granting
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authority independent of any statutes. C iutah State
Bank l' •.Jja.r, ~mpra. This was 1uade particularly clear
in State ex rel. Davis v . .f.:dward.s, supra, in which this
court stated "The attmnpt by the Legislature to require
the Auditor to allow a clahn which by the Constitution
must first be approved by the Board of Examiners can
avail nothing. The Auditor is bound by the constitutional provision, the Legislature is so bound and so
are we.''
Section 63-2-13 authorizes the Director of Finance
to prescribe salaries and the Legislature has purported
to prohibit the Board of Examiners fr01n fixing, resetting or "arbitrarily'' refusing to pay salaries so fixed.
'Vhile we do not contend that the Constitution specifically permits the Board of Examiners to adopt salary
schedules, it certainly has constitutional authority to
disapprove a salary claim and refuse to permit payment
of the smne even though the salary has been fixed by
the Director of Finance or, for that 1natter, any other
State officer or agency. Bateman v. Board of Exantiners, supra. A salary not fixed by the Legislature is a
claim against the State (State ex rel. Davis v. Edwards,
supra) and regardless of how the amount of the salary
is arrived at and the method of determining how much
should be included in the salary claim, the Board of
Examiners has the authority under the Constitution to
exercise its constitutional authority with respect to that
particular claim.
Respondent agrees with the Legislature that the
Board of Examiners has no right to act arbitrarily, but
we fail to see how the Legislature can prohibit the fixing
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or resetting of a salary based on a Director of Finance
approved salary schedule and thus prevent the Board
of Exmniners frmn acting effectively at all. Such a
result would make 1neaningless and perfunctory any
exmnination of a salary claim by the Board of Examiners. Paraphrasing the Edu·ards case, the Director of
Finance is bound b:· the constitutional provision, the
Legislature is so bound and so is this court.
In Section 63-2-15, si1nilar authority in another field,
travel expense, is granted to the Director of Finance and
for similar reasons the constitutional authority of the
Board of Examiners is interfered with. Note particula.rly that according to this section it is the Director
of Finance rather than the Board of Examiners who
has authority to review "the necessity and desirability
of such travel." Furthermore, by stating that the trav<'l
expense schedules shall have "the force of law" and
that "no voucher for travel expenses shall be paid until
the san1e have been approved by the director," the Legislature is apparent!:· atten1pting to cmnplett•ly by-pass
any review by the Board of Examiners. \Vhile the
statute does not refer to the Board of Exan1iners specifically, under the literal language a travel expense
claim, even if examined and approved by the Board of
Examiners, could not be paid if the Director of Finance
disapproved.
Finally, the Legislature in Section 63-2-20 has taken
a broad swipe at the authority of the Board of Examiners by purporting to vest authority in the Director
of Finance to review the necessity and desirability of
all Pxpenditures of funds and lin1iting the Board of
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Ji~xaminers to a revimv only after the Director of Fi-

nance has acted. The sweeping authority granted to the
Director of .B,inance by this :-;pdion is particularly objt>etionable and elParly unconstitutional, for whether the
Board of Exmniner's authority is considered a duty
or Inerely a power, the Legislature has purported to
limit the authority of the Board of Examiners to examination of claims "only after the obligation has been
incurred and an account has been submitted and audited
hy the state's accounting officer." This is a limitation
not only as to when the Board can act, but also as to
what the Board can act upon, for if a requested expenditure should be turned down or reduced by the
Director of Finance, to that extent the Board of Examiners would be denied any effective examination of that
clain1.
In other words, the Legislature may not vest authority in the Director of Finance, the Governor, or
any other agency to increase, decrease or otherwise alter
requests for expenditures of public funds so as to limit
or prevent the examination of such requests by the
Board of Examiners.
Appellants' contention that the Legislature can define the constitutional meaning of the word "claim" is
most unique. As previously pointed out, this court hr.f:
determined that the constitutional provision is selfexecuting and that the term "claim" means all demands
for payment of state funds. To permit the Legislature
to say that there is no claim until after the Director of
Finance has reviewed the necessity and desirability of
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the expenditure and approved the smne, is not only
contrary to these prior decisions, but in conflict with
the fundamental principle that a constitutional provision may not be modified or mnended by the Legislature. The term "claim" as used in the Constitution
is broad and unli1nited with the single exception of
salaries or cmnpensation fixed by law. The fact that
this one exception and no others are 1nade, is indicatiY<'
of the broad scope of the tenn and also the fact that
no other exception pertaining to the Director of Finance
or any other administrative agency was intended.
The authority purportedly granted to the Director
of Finance is more than "preliminary administrative
handling." (Appellants' Brief, p. 18) If the function of
the Director of Finance was lilnited to a determination
that funds were available and that the claim is mathematically correct, Respondent would have no objection
to a preliminary processing of the clain1 by the Director
of Finance and agree that such handling is necessary
and desirable. This was the procedure followed prior
to the effective date of Senate Bill 48. (Stipulation of
Facts, para. H (-±) (c) ; R. p. 1-1) Since that time the
Director of Finance has done more and approved or
rejected proposed expenditures as to their propriety,
a function the Constitution vests solely in the Board of
Examiners. Furthern1ore, as is evidenced by the payment of the salary clain1 of defendant Clair L. Hopkins,
the Department of Finance apparently ha:s little compunction in paying out state funds even though the
Board of Examiners has 1nade no exmnination of the
clain1.
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POI~T Ill.
THE BOARD OJ1, EX~\:\1 I XEH~ C~\XKOT
Dl1~LJ1~U AT~J rTs CONSTITUTIONAL DrTY
TO I~~XA~II~~J CLAI~IS.

The lower court determined that the Board of
cannot delegate its constitutional duty to examinP daims. This is of eonePrn to plaintiff and an
issue in this case because it is apparent that if unlimited
delegation is possible a majority of the Board of Examiners could at any time delegate all of its authority to
the Director of Finance or any other person or agency,
leaving the Board of Exmniners, as a board, without
any functions.
t~~xalllinPrs

Appellants apparently concede that a delegation of
authority by the Board of Exmniners is permissible and
must be based upon adequate standards. Respondent
agrePs.
\Ye call the court's attention to Exhibits "B" (R.
19-20), "C" (R. :21-22) and "D" (R. 23-24). These exhibits indicate the delegation of authority 1nade to the
Deparhnent of Finance in 1941 and thereafter following
the creation of the Deparhnent of Finance by Chapter
10, Laws of rtah 1941 (1st Special Session). For further background, see the opinions of the Attorney General of rtah dated August 6, 1941 and August :20, 1941.
(Biennial Report of Attorney General for Biennium
ending June 30, 1942, pages 83 and 133, respectively).
Such delegation was not only workable, but a close
examination indicates that it should be considered lawful
and valid in all respects for at all times the Board of
Exa1niners retained (and from time to time exercised)
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the ultin1ate authority to exanune and approve or disapprove clain1s of all types and, furthennore, required
the Department of Finance in its processing of claims
to notify the Board of Examiners of any major changes
in the expenditure policy of a particular department or
agency of the state. A delegation of this sort permits
the processing of routine claims without requiring members of the Board of Exan1iners to n1ake a detailed
study of each and every claim.
There would be nothing improper in the Board of
Examiners detennining that claims under a certain
dollar arnount could be approved and paid by the Department of Finance without a detailed review by the
Board of Exarniners. vVith respect to salaries, salary
schedules fonnulated by the Director of Finance and
approved by the Board of Examiners could be established as an indication that the salary clain1s conforming to these schedules would be approved by the Board
of Exan1iners thereafter and could be paid by the Department of Finance without detailed review of each
salary claim by the Board of Examiners.
In exercising these functions, it appears necessary
that the Board of Exarniners rneet regularly or at least
frequently to make such exarnination of individual clairns
as rnay be determined necessary and to fonnulate policy
and the standards by which clain1s could be approved
without detailed examination. This does not rnean, as
Appellant contends, that the Board of Exarniners n1ust
necessarily rneet to approve each IB.J[ "run" of warrants to be paid for if it chooses to delegate authority
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to the DPparhnent of :B,inance it ought to be able to
n·ly on thP Duparhnent to ad propPrly within the dele.~att·d authority. TIH· pnwtie(~ of the individual rnerntU'r~ of thP Board signing their nmnes to a :-;umuwry
Hhe..t li:-;ting the~P warrants could still be followed, if
d('Hi rahlP, as (•vid('JH'P of the Board's approval of a spe<·ifie elaim, but this should not be considered a substit utP for llH'('tings of the Board at which a quorurn is
prt>~·a·nt where through tlw interchange of ideas intellig-,·nt poliey to govern state expenditures can be fornlulated.
In other words, so long as the ultimate authority is
retained by the Board of Examiners and standards are
~t't up for the adrninistrative agency to process routine
elaims, there is no interference with the constitutional
<lutiP~ of the Board of Examiners. However, if the
Board of Exmniners by majority vote or through mere
inaction permits all claims to be processed and paid
by the Departrnent of Finance, the delegation has become an abdication of the responsibility vested by the
Constitution in the Board of Exan1iners. The lower
court n1ade this distinction by stating in its opinion
(R. 33-34) that the Board of Examiners "cannot dele~.!;ate its ultirnate duty to detennine the validity of clain1s
to the GovPrnor or to anybody else, but it may use agents
in deterrnining the existence or non-existence of certain
facts and rnay by its rules determine that certain matters
may be approved as matters of course." This determination ~hould be affirrned.
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the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully subn1itted,

H. R. \VALDO, JR.
Special Asst. Attorney General

JAMES B. LEE
Assistant Attorney General
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